


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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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28 April 1972

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

## CONTENTS

	25X1
	25X6
	25X1
<u>USSR-CHINA:</u> Soviets exaggerate progress in improving relations. (Page 5)	25X1
<u>JAPAN - NORTH VIETNAM:</u> Tokyo remains cautious on economic commitments. (Page 9)	25X1
<u>JORDAN - PERSIAN GULF:</u> Husayn will provide military support for Gulf states. (Page 13)	25X1

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

USSR-CHINA: Moscow appears to be exaggerating its progress in improving relations with China.

In a recent discussion official, Mikhail Kapitsa, the leading China expert in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, painted an unusually glowing picture of relations with Peking. Kapitsa claimed that Moscow and Peking are near agreement "in principle" on a document that would base Sino-Soviet relations on the principles of peaceful co-existence. Kapitsa added that such a compact would include pledges of non-use of force and "non-use of rockets."

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### Kapitsa's comments

25X1

[redacted] are the first to mention such an agreement on peaceful coexistence. In his major address on 20 March, Brezhnev offered to base Sino-Soviet relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence if the Chinese were not prepared to adhere to "socialist principles" in international dealings.

Although other Soviet diplomats have taken a pessimistic view of current Sino-Soviet relations and have said that Moscow had little new to offer the Chinese, it is possible that the Soviets have made a new approach along the lines Kapitsa and Brezhnev outlined. The Chinese, however, have taken a negative view of earlier Soviet proposals for a non-aggression agreement, and there have been no indications that they would be any more receptive to new proposals.

25X1

Kapitsa probably expected his comments to reach Washington. With President Nixon's visit in less than a month, Moscow probably sees considerable benefit in portraying Sino-Soviet relations in as positive terms as possible. After Moscow offered a

28 Apr 72

## *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

5

25X1

non-aggression agreement last year, Chou En-lai personally charged that Moscow's real intention in seeking such a pact with China at that time was to create an impression of Communist unity in order to improve its position for dealing with the US. It seems highly unlikely that the Chinese would look with favor on an agreement that would make Moscow's dealings with Washington any easier.

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25X1

28 Apr 72

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

6

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

JAPAN - NORTH VIETNAM: Tokyo made few commitments to a recent North Vietnamese trade mission to Japan, and the Vietnamese were clearly disappointed with their failure to secure Export-Import Bank credits.

The Vietnamese agreed to consider a Japanese proposal for regularized government contacts in Paris or Vientiane, and progress was reportedly made on an exchange of journalists and politicians. Little else of a substantive nature was achieved. In reply to Vietnamese expressions of interest in an expansion of trade and of technical personnel exchanges, Tokyo said that any near-term upgrading would have to be done on a private basis. The key questions of extending Japanese Government trade credits to Hanoi and of exchanging permanent, semi-official trade missions were not specifically discussed.

As a result of talks with Japanese Foreign Ministry officials who visited Hanoi last February, the Vietnamese apparently came to Tokyo with the mistaken belief that Japan was prepared to grant a \$20-million low-interest, long-term loan. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Hanoi was ready to post trade officers in Tokyo. No Vietnamese remained in Japan, however, and the delegation left for home ten days early. Hanoi, anxious to upgrade its economic and diplomatic contacts in the non-Communist world, may give further consideration to establishing an informal trade office, even if no official aid is forthcoming.

Tokyo too is interested in building a base for improved relations and is attempting to secure a major role in Vietnam's postwar reconstruction. The coincidence of the visit with the current North Vietnamese offensive probably caused the Japanese to be more cautious at this time, and they are likely to maintain a conservative position on granting aid until an end to the war is in sight. [redacted]

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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

JORDAN - PERSIAN GULF: King Husayn is trying to enhance Jordan's over-all political position by developing military support relationships with the states of the Persian Gulf.

Husayn has told the US ambassador in Amman that Jordan is prepared, if asked, to send combat units to the Gulf states to assist local rulers in maintaining order. Speaking to a visiting US delegation earlier, the King said Jordan intended to supply officers, noncommissioned officers, security men, teachers, and communications experts to the Gulf States. It was for these reasons, he said, that he had asked the US to supply Jordan with two C-130 aircraft instead of the four C-119s now on order.

The Jordanians revealed yesterday that Abu Dhabi has already asked them for 31 106-mm. recoilless rifles, which the Jordanian Army would like to provide from its own stocks if it can get replacements from the US. [redacted]

[redacted] the Jordanians are forming military assistance teams to visit Qatar, Oman, and Abu Dhabi. In addition, King Husayn told the US delegation that Sultan Qabus of Oman would be coming to Jordan soon and that the King expected a new relationship between the two states to be formalized at that time in a "dramatic way." A hint of what the King may have in mind was provided in an earlier report that his uncle, Sharif Nasir Bin Jamil, visited Oman last month to arrange a marriage between Qabus and Husayn's eldest daughter.

The Jordanians for some time have been interested in military advisory relationships with the Gulf States. A few Jordanian advisers have been attached to the defense forces of Bahrain and Abu Dhabi, and representatives of Husayn and Sultan Qabus have been discussing the seconding of a large contingent of Jordanian noncommissioned officers and junior officers to the ranks of the Sultan's armed forces. Jordan's growing isolation from its neighbor states probably has stimulated the King's interest in broadening his relations with the Gulf rulers, who are wary of establishing dependent relations with their own near neighbors. [redacted]

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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